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The European Court lifted the Italian ban on pre-implantation diagnostics (PGD). As such the Court 
accepted PGD as a generally accepted means for medically assisted procreation, which 
mayhaveconsequences for other member states prohibiting PGD.  
 




1On August 28, 2012, the Council of Europe’s Human 
Rights Court concluded that the Italian ban on 
embryonic screening violated article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which 
provides a right to respect for one’s private and 
family life (1). Since Italy is one of the few countries 
prohibiting pre-implantation diagnostics (PGD) for 
medically-assisted procreation, this ruling may force 
Italy to lift this ban in the near future. 
The applicants, Rosetta Costa and Walter Pavan, 
are an Italian couple. In 2006, after they had a 
daughter born with cystic fibrosis they found out they 
were both carriers of the disease. During a second 
pregnancy Mrs Costa opted for an abortion because 
upon prenatal screening the fetus was diagnosed with 
cystic fibrosis. 
This time the couple wanted to have a child by in 
vitro fertilization (IVF), and to genetically screen the 
embryo prior to implantation (PGD). However, Italian 
law prohibits PGD. On the other hand, it allows IVF 
for infertile couples and those situations in which the 
man has a sexually transmitted disease such as HIV or 
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hepatitis B or C, to avoid transmitting the infection (2). 
The couple claimed that the only way to have a healthy 
baby would be by starting a pregnancy in a natural 
way, have the fetus’ genetic profile monitored 
throughout pregnancy, and then decide to terminate the 
pregnancy every time the fetus was tested positively 
for cystic fibrosis.  Such a stressful procedure is the 
direct result of the ban on PGD, which interfered with 
their right to start a family.  
In this case, the Court considered the 
Convention’s right to private and family life 
applicable (Article 8). Traditionally, the focus was on 
privacy of health information. Nowadays, however, 
the concept of private life is interpreted more 
broadlyincluding “a person’sphysical and 
psychological integrity, and may even include a right 
to establish and develop relationships” (3). Apart 
from abstaining from arbitrary intervention in the 
private sphere, article 8 incorporates so-called 
‘positive obligations’ of member states to realize the 
fulfilment of a private life. These positive obligations 
may cover: facilitating access to fertility treatment, 
access to donor insemination, and the implantation of 
de-frozen embryo (4). Since assisted procreation is a 
controversial issue in the member states, the Court 
allows member states a wide margin of appreciation 
in terms of deciding on the nature and extent of these 
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obligations.Furthermore, the Court allows member 
states to formulate restrictions on family life for 
specific reasons (e.g., protection of health and 
morals) and in accordance with the law. 
The Italian government defended the ban as an 
interference “to protect the health of the mother and 
child, and to avoid the risk of eugenic abuses”. In its 
review, the Court criticized this justification since 
Italian law accepts a therapeutic abortion in case of 
genetic defects such ascystic fibrosis, but 
simultaneously prohibiting a less invasive and less 
stressful selection method like PGD. This 
inconsistency in legislation, causing harm to the 
couple, was reason for the Court to conclude that the 
ban on PGD was a disproportionate (ineffective and 
unnecessary) interference of the couple's private life 
and therefore violated their right to private and 
family life.  
This outcome can be considered as a victory for 
fertile couples genetically afflicted with cystic 
fibrosis. Apart from this conclusion the Court made 
another interesting observation, namely that more 
than 32 Council of Europe member states already 
allowed PGD as a means for medically assisted 
procreation. The Court therefore concluded that there 
is consensus on this ethical delicate issue. In addition, 
the Biomedicine Convention, although not ratified by 
Italy, also legitimizes predictive and genetic 
screening test for health purposes (5).What the Court  
is saying is that, in case there was no consensus, the 
Court may have accepted Italy's wide margin of 
appreciation in banning PGD. 
Although the Court accepted a right to access to 
embryonic screening, article 8 must not be interpreted 
as providing claimants with a right to a genetic 
healthy child. Such a claim would be illusory since 
one cannot claim health as a legal right. Instead, one 
can claim access to health care services as a means to 
achieve good health. Secondly, PGD and other 
genetic screening technologies cannot fully exclude 
all genetic risks. 
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